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which features a housing market, borrowers, savers and banks, in order to evaluate the welfare and
macroeconomic e¤ects of the new xed capital requirements in the Basel accords. Our results show
that the higher capital requirements imposed by Basel I, II and III decrease both the quantity of
borrowing and its variability, producing distributional welfare e¤ects among agents: savers are better
o¤, but borrowers and banks are worse o¤. Then, we propose a macroprudential rule for the counter-
cyclical capital bu¤er of Basel III in which capital requirements respond to credit growth, output and
housing prices. We nd that the optimal implementation of Basel III is countercyclical for borrowers
and banks, the agents directly a¤ected by capital requirements, while procyclical for savers. From a
normative perspective, we see that this macroprudential rule for Basel III delivers higher welfare for
the society than a situation with no regulation.
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"The nancial crisis brought home the lesson that nancial stability could not be assured only through
the use of microprudential tools. And so Basel III represents another important step in the Committees
development. Basel III has substantially enhanced the microprudential framework. And, in the counter-
cyclical bu¤er, it has also introduced the rst international agreement on a macroprudential tool". Stefan
Ingves, Chairman of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and Governor of Sveriges Riksbank, at
a symposium to mark 25 years of the Basel Capital Accord: 25 years of international nancial regulation:
Challenges and opportunities, Basel, 26 September 2013.
1 Introduction
After the introduction of new bank capital regulations by the Basel accords, there exists a continuing
public policy concern about the macroeconomic impact of these codes of practice, especially in the
aftermath of the nancial crisis. In this paper, we perform an analysis of the impact of xed capital
requirements corresponding to Basel I, II, and III in a DSGE model featuring a housing market and
a nancial intermediary.1 We contribute to the literature on several fronts. First, we explore the
distributional implications of bank capital requirements imposed by Basel I, II, and III on patient
unconstrained savers, impatient nancial constrained borrowers, and nancial intermediaries. While the
literature nds a small aggregate impact, our results show larger distributional e¤ects: savers are better
o¤when banks are required to hold more capital, but borrowers and banks are initially worse o¤with this
measure. Second, we are able to quantify the gains in nancial stability coming from the regulation, by
taking the variability of borrowing as the closest measure.2 Third, we propose a rule to approximate the
countercyclical capital bu¤er in which the capital requirement responds not only to credit variables but
also to house prices and output. Finally, we contribute to the discussion of the procyclical e¤ects of Basel
III by showing that, for the optimal implementation that we calculate, the regulation is countercyclical
for borrowers and banks while procyclical for savers.
In order to achieve our research goals, we build a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model
(DSGE). The advantage of using this kind of models is that, since they are general equilibrium, they
can account for the interactions of all the relevant variables in the economy. They are dynamic, and
therefore the e¤ects of di¤erent shocks can be studied. They rely on deep parameters and are, thus,
1The machinery of this paper cannot compare Basel I with Basel II since this would require distinguishing two assets
of di¤erent riskiness in order to introduce the impact of Basel II risk weightings based on the internal ratings-based (IRB)
risk curves, and, in this model, there is only one kind of bank lending. Then, Basel I and Basel II are analyzed together.
2Note that in a linearized model it is di¢ cult to nd a denition for nancial stability.
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free from the Lucas critique, allowing to analyze counterfactuals and do policy evaluation. And nally,
since they are microfounded, they are suitable for welfare analysis. In particular, we construct a Real
Business Cycle model (RBC) which relies on technology shocks as the main source of macroeconomic
uctuations.3
Our model features borrowers, savers, and nancial intermediaries. The reason for splitting house-
holds into borrowers and savers is that in this way, in equilibrium, credit is not zero as in a representative
agent problem. Borrowers are constrained in the amount they can borrow while banks are constrained
in the amount they can lend; that is, they have a capital requirement ratio. We study rst how capital
requirements a¤ect dynamics and welfare. We observe that higher capital requirements decrease the
quantity of borrowing in the economy and that reduces borrowers and banks consumption. In terms of
welfare, savers are better o¤ if capital requirements increase, while borrowers and banks are worse o¤
initially. After a certain threshold, volatility e¤ects prevail for these latter agents and their welfare also
increases.
Then, we propose a macroprudential rule for the capital bu¤er of Basel III. Authorities may emphasize
any variables that make sense to them for purposes of assessing the sustainability of credit growth and the
level of system-wide risk. Some examples of variables that may be useful indicators are asset prices, GDP,
and credit condition indicators. Then, along these lines, we propose a countercyclical macroprudential
rule in which capital requirements respond to credit growth, output and housing prices. Then, we
compute the optimal parameters that maximize welfare. Our results show that the regulator, when
implementing the rule, should attach relatively more weight to output and house prices, rather than to
credit growth, given that the former ones serve as an anticipated indicator of credit growth; when the
regulator observes credit growth itself, it may be too late to avoid it. An optimal implementation of the
macroprudential component of Basel III is welfare improving. Furthermore, the optimal implementation
of Basel III with the countercyclical capital bu¤er is, precisely, countercyclical for banks and borrowers,
the ones directly a¤ected by capital requirements and collateral constraints, but procyclical for savers,
not a¤ected by any friction.
The rest of the paper continues as follows. Section 1.1 makes a review of the literature. Section 2
presents the modeling framework. Section 3 displays simulations. Section 4 studies welfare. Section 5
analyzes the optimal implementation of the countercyclical capital bu¤er of Basel III. Section 6 concludes.
3Since this paper does not focus on monetary policy, prices are fully exible here.
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1.1 Policy Background and Related Literature
Basel III is a comprehensive set of post-crisis reform measures in banking regulation, supervision and
risk management. It was developed by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) at the
Bank for International Settlements (BIS), to strengthen the banking sector and achieve nancial stabil-
ity. Furthermore, some of the new measures that Basel III introduces are aimed at preventing future
crises, creating a sound nancial system in which nancial problems are not spread to the real econ-
omy. Preventive measures acting in this direction are known between researchers and policy-makers as
"macroprudential policies."
The BCBS seeks to deliver some guidance for banking regulators on what the best practice for banks
is. Its standards are accepted worldwide and are generally incorporated in national banking regulations.
Basel I, signed in 1988, was the rst accord on the issue. Basel I primarily focused on credit risk:
banks with international presence were required to hold capital equal to 8 % of the risk-weighted assets.
Basel II, initially published in June 2004, was intended to create an international standard for banking
regulators to control how much capital banks need to put aside to guard against the types of nancial and
operational risks banks and the whole economy face. The BCBS issued a new agreement in 2010, known
as the Basel III Accord, to increase the resilience of the system and to prevent the occurrence of a nancial
crisis in the future. This new accord introduces a mandatory capital conservation bu¤er of 2.5% designed
to enforce corrective action when a banks capital ratio deteriorates. Then, although the minimum total
capital requirement remains at the current 8% level, yet the required total capital increases up to 10.5%
when combined with the conservation bu¤er. Furthermore, it also adds a macroprudential element in
the form of a countercyclical capital bu¤er up to another 2.5% of capital, which asks banks to hold more
capital in good times to prepare for inevitable downturns in the economy. In this way, Basel III tries to
achieve the broader macroprudential goal of reducing systemic risk, which in turns protects the banking
sector from periods of excessive credit growth.
Our work is related with the literature which emphasizes the externalities associated with bank
lending and credit and in particular through the price of collateral. For instance, Lorenzoni (2008)
and Bianchi (2011) highlight that when individual nancial institutions borrow, they may not take into
account the possibility that their action could depress collateral values and hence tighten the borrowing
constraints throughout the system. In this spirit, the macroprudential tool that we propose for the
countercyclical capital bu¤er of Basel III can maintain nancial stability by explicitly accounting for the
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externalities arising from the behavior of individual institutions as well as the structure of the nancial
system. This tool may face the ex-ante externalities that lead to an excessive build-up of systemic risk,
and the ex-post externalities that can generate ine¢ cient failures of institutions in a crisis. As well,
Aikman et al. (2010) and Aikman et al. (2012) consider that banks may have incentives to undertake
excessive lending due to strategic complementarities (reputational concerns, for instance) when other
banks are protable and are expanding lending. Therefore, an increase in our countercyclical capital
bu¤er during a credit boom would improve resilience directly by enhancing the loss-absorbing capacity
of the system because it would tighten the constraint on nancial institutions, such that they cannot
increase their risk-weighted assets beyond a certain multiple of equity capital. This policy action could
in some circumstances, as Giese et al. (2013) describe, raise the funding costs of nancial institutions.
When higher funding costs translate into higher lending rates, credit growth would slow down. In
addition to increasing banks capacity to absorb losses, stricter capital requirements might therefore
help moderate an unsustainable credit boom, thereby reducing the probability of a crisis
The seminal contribution by Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) stress that collateralized borrowing hinges
on market values, yet such market values are endogenous to the economy and out of control by creditors
and debtors. In that line of research, the recent work of Pintus et al. (2015) point out that the market
value of collateral generates an externality that serves to amplify and propagate business cycle shocks.
We nd that this externality can be used in a countercyclical way for macroprudential purposes. That is,
we use this externality to control the cycle via a macroprudential tool based on the price of collateral. For
instance, when the economy is overheated, the macroprudential tool can let the market value of collateral
to be below trend, collateralized borrowing restricts credit lending, and, thanks to the externality, this
creates a downturn.
Our paper is also connected as well with the literature that uses a DSGE model to study the e¤ects of
a macroprudential rule, given the macroprudential avor of Basel III. For instance, Antipa et al. (2010)
use a DSGE model to show that macroprudential policies would have been e¤ective in smoothing the
past credit cycle and in reducing the intensity of the recession. Some of the scholars have used this type
of models to study the loan-to-value ratio (LTV) as a macroprudential tool, such as Kannan et al. (2012)
or Rubio and Carrasco-Gallego (2015), among others. In our paper, we also use a DSGE framework to
evaluate the capital requirement ratios of Basel I and II (8%) and Basel III (10.5%) plus the optimal
parameterization of the countercyclical capital bu¤er as a macroprudential tool. Our strategy can be
summarized as consistent on adding a second layer of nancially constrained agents which are the banks.
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We use this framework to evaluate the compulsory capital requirement ratios of Basel I, II and III and
the countercyclical capital bu¤er that this latter regulation proposes.
This setting lets us add some light to the discussion about capital regulation that the recent nancial
crisis put at the forefront. Even the BCBS recognizes a negative but low e¤ect on economic growth
although considers that the benets from reducing the probability of nancial crises and the output
losses associated with such crises are larger (see BCBS, 2010). In this line, some policy-makers and
scholars argue in favour of a substantial increase in capital requirements (see, e.g., Admati et al., 2013)
because of the positive welfare e¤ects. Albeit, others claim that a more restrictive bank regulation might
have negative impact for credit extension and growth (see, e.g., Adrian and Ashcraft, 2012). The welfare
evaluation that we develop is a complete welfare analysis for the di¤erent agents of the economy that
lets a better understanding of a change in the capital requirement ratio because it disentangles the level
and volatility e¤ects for each agent. We nd that the distributional impacts are relatively large, even
when the aggregate welfare e¤ects are small, because there is a welfare trade-o¤ between borrowers and
savers.
We also contribute by proposing a macroprudential rule for the capital bu¤er of Basel III. Before us,
other academics have analyzed this capital bu¤er with a DSGE framework and proposed some rules. For
instance, Kannan et al. (2012) assume that policy-makers can a¤ect the market lending rate by imposing
additional capital requirements or additional provisioning when credit growth is above its steady-state
value. Angelini et al. (2014) introduce a time-varying capital ratio that adjusts the requirements only in
response to movements in the loans-to-output ratio. We propose a macroprudential rule for the capital
bu¤er of Basel III in which capital requirements respond to credit growth, output and house prices. We
believe that these three variables are able to capture the spirit of BCBS (2010) that considers that useful
indicators of assessing the sustainability of credit growth and the level of system-wide risk are asset
prices, GDP, and credit condition indicators. Drehmann et al. (2010) also point out that the deviations
of credit from its long-term trend are very good indicators of the increase in systemic risk, which is the
macroprudential attention. We nd the optimal parameters of the rule that maximize welfare and see
that the regulator should attach relatively more weight to the output and the house price parameters in
the rule, rather than to the credit growth parameter, given that they serve as an anticipated indicator
of credit growth. Our results are in line of Jiménez et al.(2014) who empirically show that building
up capital bu¤ers before a crisis occurs is superior in terms of maintaining real activity and avoiding
risk-shifting than changing requirements during the crisis period. In terms of welfare, we see that the
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macroprudential component of Basel III delivers higher welfare for the society than a situation with no
regulation.
With this paper, we add some new insights to the analysis of the cyclicality of the new regulation. Our
model dynamics show that, using the optimized parameters for the macroprudential capital bu¤er, after
an expansionary shock, when GDP is going up, the regulator increases capital requirements. This, in
turn, cuts borrowing, and achieves the goal of the regulation, which is to avoid excessive credit growth. A
number of other studies have also found that increasing capital requirements may reduce credit supply
(Kishan and Opiela, 2000; Gambacorta and Mistrulli, 2004). In the same line, Akram (2014) nds
that the proposed increases in capital requirements under Basel III are found to have signicant e¤ects
especially on house prices and credit. Our results are related to Drehmann and Gambacorta (2011) which
show a simulation that indicates that the countercyclical bu¤er scheme might reduce credit growth during
credit booms and decrease the credit contraction once the bu¤er is released. This would help to achieve
higher banking sector resilience to shocks. Nevertheless, their procedure is subject to the Lucas critique:
had the scheme been in place, bankslending decisions would probably have been di¤erent. However,
our approach is robust to this critique because is based on a DSGE model.
There also exists some controversy around this regulation that has been pointed out by the literature.
In particular, some concerns have been raised about the impact of Basel III reforms on the dynamism
of nancial markets and, in turn, on investment and economic growth. The reasoning is that Basel III
regulation could produce a decline in the amount of credit and impact negatively in the whole economy.
Critics of Basel III consider that there is a real danger that this reform will limit the availability of
credit and reduce economic activity. Repullo and Saurina (2012) show that a mechanical application of
Basel III regulation would tend to reduce capital requirements when GDP growth is high and increase
them when GDP growth is low. Then, if banks increase capital requirements during crises, credit will
be reduced and the economic growth will be even lower; with a lower growth, welfare will decrease.
This is the so-called risk of procyclicality, that is, Basel III could cause a deeper recession in bad times
and a higher boom in good ones. Furthermore, it could have an adverse impact on growth plans of the
industry, as pointed out by Kant and Jain (2013). If capital requirement ratios increase, households
and industries cannot borrow as much, and their plans for recovery would be a¤ected, having an impact
on the whole economy. Some authors have attempted to evaluate the e¤ects of capital ratios such as
Angeloni and Faia (2013) and Repullo and Suárez (2013). They compare the procyclicality of Basel II
and Basel I, the previous frameworks. They nd that Basel II is more procyclical than Basel I. In our
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paper, we add to this discussion. Our results show that the e¤ect is countercyclical for borrowers and
banks, the agents directly a¤ected by capital requirements, while procyclical for savers.
2 Model Setup
The economy features patient and impatient households, banks and a nal goods rm. Households
work and consume both consumption goods and housing. Patient and impatient households are savers
and borrowers, respectively. Financial intermediaries intermediate funds between consumers. Banks are
credit constrained in how much they can borrow from savers, and borrowers are credit constrained with
respect to how much they can borrow from banks. The representative rm converts household labor
into the nal good.
2.1 Savers
Savers maximize their utility function by choosing consumption, housing and labor hours:
maxE0
1X
t=0
ts

logCs;t + j logHs;t   (Ns;t)



;
where s 2 (0; 1) is the patient discount factor, E0 is the expectation operator and Cs;t, Hs;t and
Ns;t represent consumption at time t, the housing stock and working hours, respectively. 1= (   1) is
the labor supply elasticity,  > 0: j > 0 constitutes the relative weight of housing in the utility function.
Subject to the budget constraint:
Cs;t +Dt + qt (Hs;t  Hs;t 1) = Rs;t 1Dt 1 +Ws;tNs;t; (1)
where Dt denotes bank deposits, Rs;t is the gross return from deposits, qt is the price of housing in
units of consumption, andWs;t is the wage rate. The rst order conditions for this optimization problem
are as follows:
1
Cs;t
= sEt

1
Cs;t+1
Rs;t

(2)
qt
Cs;t
=
j
Hs;t
+ sEt

qt+1
Cs;t+1

(3)
Ws;t = (Ns;t)
 1Cs;t (4)
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Equation (2) is the Euler equation, the intertemporal condition for consumption, which implies that
savers smooth consumption over time. Equation (3) represents the intertemporal condition for housing,
in which, at the margin, benets for consuming housing equate costs in terms of consumption. Equation
(4) is the labor-supply condition.
2.2 Borrowers
Borrowers solve:
maxE0
1X
t=0
tb

logCb;t + j logHb;t   (Nb;t)



;
where b 2 (0; 1) is the impatient discount factor, subject to the budget constraint and the collateral
constraint:4
Cb;t +Rb;tBt 1 + qt (Hb;t  Hb;t 1) = Bt +Wb;tNb;t; (5)
Bt  Et

1
Rb;t+1
kqt+1Hb;t

; (6)
where Bt denotes bank loans and Rb;t is the gross interest rate to be paid by borrowers for their
loans. k can be interpreted as a loan-to-value ratio.5 The borrowing constraint limits borrowing to the
present discounted value of their housing holdings, that is, they use housing as collateral.6 The rst
order conditions are as follows:
1
Cb;t
= bEt

1
Cb;t+1
Rb;t+1

+ b;t; (7)
j
Hb;t
= Et

1
Cb;t
qt   bEt

qt+1
Cb;t+1

  b;t 1
Rb;t+1
kqt+1; (8)
4Our setup is DSGE, since it represents an extension of a simple Real Business Cycle (RBC) model with collateral
constraints a-la-Kiyotaki and Moore. The stochastic nature of the model comes from technology shocks, which are the
source of business cycle uctuations. As in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), the introduction of the collateral constraint ensures
that debt repayments are always fullled and default is ruled out.
5Rubio and Carrasco-Gallego (2014) nd that, starting from a value of the LTV of 0.55, there is a trade-o¤ between
borrowers and savers in terms of welfare when we keep increasing the LTV. Large values of the LTV harm borrowers while
savers benet from the increase. Social welfare decreases.
6This collateral constraint a-la-Kiyotaki and Moore generates a nancial accelerator. Shocks that lower house prices
make consumption by borrowers decrease through the loan-to-value constraint, in the spirit of what happened during the
recent nancial crisis.
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Wb;t = (Nb;t)
 1Cb;t; (9)
where b;t denotes the multiplier on the borrowing constraint. These rst order conditions can be
interpreted analogously to the ones of savers with the di¤erence that collateral terms appear in them
reecting wealth e¤ects. Through simple algebra, it can be shown that the Lagrange multiplier is positive
in the steady state and thus the collateral constraint holds with equality.7 This means that borrowers,
unlike savers, cannot smooth consumption because their consumption comes determined by how much
they can borrow.8 This represents the rst distortion of the model: borrowers do not have free access
to nancial markets and thus cannot freely smooth consumption.
2.3 Financial Intermediaries
Banks solve the following problem:
maxE0
1X
t=0
tf [logDivf;t] ;
where f 2 (0; 1) is the nancial intermediary discount factor and Divf;t are dividends. Subject to
the budget constraint and the collateral constraint:9
Divf;t +Rs;t 1Dt 1 +Bt = Dt +Rb;tBt 1; (10)
where the right-hand side measures the sources of funds for the nancial intermediary; household
deposits and repayments from borrowers on previous loans. The funds can be used to pay back depositors
and to extend new loans, or can be used as dividends. We assume here that dividends are transformed
into consumption by banks, so that Divf;t = Cf;t: As in Iacoviello (2015), we assume that the bank,
by regulation, is constrained by the amount of assets minus liabilities, as a fraction of assets. That is,
there is a capital requirement ratio. We dene capital as assets minus liabilities, so that, the fraction of
capital with respect to assets has to be larger than a certain ratio:
7 In this model, as in Iacoviello-type models, low uncertainty and small curvature of the utility function are su¢ cient
to guarantee that the borrowing constraint is always binding over the relevant range and therefore there is no negative
consumption.
8As discussed in Iacoviello (2005), the frequency of borrowing constrained periods depends on the loan-to-value ratio.
9 In a model without banks and a capital constraint, there would not be any spread between the lending and the deposit
rate. The capital constraint is introducing an extra distortion in the economy that a¤ects agentswelfare.
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Bt  Dt
Bt
 CRR: (11)
Simple algebra shows that this relationship can be rewritten as:
Dt  (1  CRR)Bt; (12)
If we dene  = (1  CRR), we can reinterpret the capital requirement ratio condition as a standard
collateral constraint, so that banks liabilities cannot exceed a fraction of its assets, which can be used
as collateral:10
Dt  Bt; (13)
where  < 1. The rst order conditions for deposits and loans are as follows:
1
Cf;t
= fEt

1
Cf;t+1
Rs;t

+ f;t; (14)
1
Cf;t
= fEt

1
Cf;t+1
Re;t+1

+ f;t; (15)
where f;t denotes the multiplier on the nancial intermediarys borrowing constraint. Financial
intermediaries have a discount factor f < s: This condition ensures that the collateral constraint of
the intermediary holds with equality in the steady state, since f =
s f
s 0.
11 This binding constraint
represents the second distortion of the model. The fact that nancial intermediaries need to hold a certain
amount of capital determines their dividends and therefore their consumption. Thus, like borrowers, they
are not consumption smoothers.12
Table 1 displays the assets and the liabilities of the di¤erent agents for a better understanding of the
10This constraint creates a relationship between capital requirements and the volatility of borrower consumption. Bank
capital constraints provide a substantial benet of reducing the sensitivity of consumption to house prices and avoiding
nancial problems.
11 In the real world, bank capital reduces moral hazard problems and the probability of a nancial crisis. However, the
model is not able to capture such benets due to the presence of binding borrowing constraints that rule out the possibility
of rms and banks to go in default. However, as Clerc et al. (2014) nd, using a DSGE model, the probability of default
for banks is negligible for capital requirement ratios higher than 10%, in the range of Basel III regulation.
12The model without banks reduces to Iacoviello (2005) or Rubio and Carrasco-Gallego (2014). These models are similar
in spirit to this one but display a collateral constraint only on the borrowers side. In these models, the binding loan-
to-value constraint is essential in order for the economy to be endogenously divided into borrowers and savers, so that it
is assured that borrowers always borrow and consume a positive amount, which is nanced by the savers. At the same
time, the model dynamics are symmetric under the assumption of di¤erent discount factors among agents, which makes the
constraint always binding, provided that shocks are small enough. As in Iacoviello (2005), this is the approach we take.
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structure of the model.
Table 1: Assets and Liabilities
Savers Borrowers Banks
Assets Liabilities Assets Liabilities Assets Liabilities
Deposits Dt Dt
Borrowing Bt Bt
Housing qtHs;t qtHb;t
Equity Capital (1  )Bt
2.4 Firms
Firms produce the nal consumption good. The problem for the nal good rms is standard and static.
They maximize prots subject to the production function by using labor from both types of households:13
maxt = Yt  Ws;tNs;t  Wb;tNb;t;
Yt = AtN

s;tN
1 
b;t ; (16)
whereAt represents a technology parameter. The problem delivers the standard rst-order conditions,
which represent the labor-demand equations:
Ws;t =
Yt
Ns;t
; (17)
Wb;t =
(1  )Yt
Nb;t
: (18)
2.5 Equilibrium
The total supply of housing is xed and it is normalized to unity:
Hs;t +Hb;t = 1: (19)
13Following the literature that starts with Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and builds up with Iacoviello (2005) and Iacoviello
(2015), we assume that output is produced with labor supplied from both agents. In this way we make our model comparable
with the rest of the literature.
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The goods market clearing condition is as follows:
Yt = Cs;t + Cb;t + Cf;t; (20)
Labor supply (equations 4 and 9) and labor demand (equations 17 and 18) are equal to each other, so
that labor markets also clear. Equilibrium in nancial markets is dictated by the regulatory constraint
for banks, that is, Dt = (1  CRR)Bt:
3 Simulation
3.1 Parameter Values
The discount factor for savers, s, is set to 0.99 so that the annual interest rate is 4% in steady state.
The discount factor for the borrowers is set to 0.98.14 As in Iacoviello (2015), we set the discount
factors for the bankers at 0.965 which, together with the bank leverage parameters implies a spread of
about 1 percent (on an annualized basis) between lending and deposit rates. The steady-state weight
of housing in the utility function, j, is set to 0.1 in order for the ratio of housing wealth to GDP to be
approximately 1.40 in the steady state, consistent with the US data. We set  = 2, implying a value
of the labor supply elasticity of 1.15 For the parameters controlling leverage, we set k and  to 0.90,
which implies a capital requirement ratio of 10%, in line with the US data.16 The labor income share for
savers is set to 0.64, following the estimate in Iacoviello (2005). We assume that technology, At, follows
an autoregressive process with 0:9 persistence and a normally distributed shock. Table 2 presents a
summary of the parameter values used:
14Lawrance (1991) estimated discount factors for poor consumers at between 0.95 and 0.98 at quarterly frequency. We
take the most conservative value.
15Microeconomic estimates usually suggest values in the range of 0 and 0.5 (for males). Domeij and Flodén (2006) show
that in the presence of borrowing constraints this estimates could have a downward bias of 50%.
16See Iacoviello (2015).
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Table 2: Parameter Values
s :99 Discount Factor for Savers
b :98 Discount Factor for Borrowers
f :965 Discount Factor for Banks
j :1 Weight of Housing in Utility Function
 2 Parameter associated with labor elasticity
k :90 Loan-to-value ratio
CRR :10 Capital Requirement ratio
 :64 Labor income share for Savers
A :9 Technology persistence
3.2 Dynamics
3.2.1 Baseline Model
In this section, we simulate the impulse responses of the baseline model to illustrate its dynamics.17
Figure 1 presents the impulse responses to a 1 percent shock to technology.18 Notice that this
represents a positive analysis in which the dynamics of the model are described. Given the increase in
technology, output increases and thus, consumption for the three agents increases. Borrowing increases
and borrowers demand more housing, which is just partially compensated by a decrease in the housing
by the savers. The increase housing demand, makes house prices go up. Therefore, since now housing
collateral is worth more, consumption for borrowers increases further, given the collateral constraint
they face. In this model, wealth e¤ects are present through the collateral constraint. Situations in
which house prices increase make the value of the collateral higher, and thus, wealth e¤ects expand the
economy even further.19
17We solve the model using the standard approach in the literature that is, linearizing the structural equations around
the deterministic steady state. A DSGE model takes the mathematical form of a system of nonlinear stochastic equations.
Except in a very few cases, there is no analytical solution and we need to obtain approximated solutions. Global approxi-
mation methods are available when the state space is not too large, while the most usual approach is local approximation
around the deterministic steady state. The deterministic steady state, as we use for our solution, is dened as the equi-
librium position of the system in absence of shocks: it is the point in the state space where agents decide to stay when
there is no shock in the current period and they do not expect any shocks in the future. One of the shortcomings of this
approach is that the deterministic steady state ignores agentsattitude towards risk, because uncertainty is removed from
the deterministic version of the model.
18Given the collateral constraints introduced in this model, it displays a nancial accelerator. This means that even
though shocks are generated in the real sector, they will be transmitted and amplied through the nancial sector. In this
way, TFP shocks are reecting the interconnectedness between the real economy and nancial markets and therefore can
be a good source of disturbances to evaluate the regulation.
19Simulations to positive and negative shocks are symmetric.
14
5 10 15 20
0
0.5
1
Output
%
 d
ev
. S
S
5 10 15 20
0
2
4
Borrowing
5 10 15 20
-0.1
0
0.1
Spread
5 10 15 20
0
0.5
1
Consumption Savers
%
 d
ev
. S
S
5 10 15 20
0
2
4
Consumption Borrowers
5 10 15 20
0
2
4
Consumption Banks
5 10 15 20
-1
-0.5
0
Housing Savers
%
 d
ev
. S
S
quarters
5 10 15 20
0
2
4
Housing Borrowers
quarters
5 10 15 20
0
0.5
1
House Prices
quarters
Figure 1: Impulse responses to a technology shock.
3.2.2 Di¤erent Capital Requirements
In order to understand the e¤ect of the regulation on banks on the dynamics, here we simulate the model
for di¤erent capital requirement ratios.
Figure 2 presents impulse responses to a technology shock for three di¤erent capital requirement
ratios. We observe that, when the capital requirement ratio increases, borrowing decreases, the interest
rate spread increases, and therefore borrowers consume less. Banks, since they are not able to lend as
much, also su¤er a decrease in their consumption. However, the e¤ect is the opposite for savers and this
compensates the e¤ect on borrowers and banks. Therefore, the overall e¤ects are distributional and they
do not a¤ect the aggregate. Notice that these are, though, rst order level e¤ects and, while describing
the dynamics of the model, represent positive results. In order to infer some normative conclusion, a
welfare analysis must be made. We perform this exercise in the following section.
4 Welfare
4.1 Welfare Measure
To assess the normative implications of the di¤erent policies, we numerically evaluate the welfare derived
in each case. As discussed in Benigno and Woodford (2008), a popular approach that has recently been
used for welfare analysis in DSGE models include solving the model using a second-order approximation
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Figure 2: Impulse responses to a technology shock. Di¤erent capital requirement ratios.
to the structural equations for given policy and then evaluating welfare using this solution. Thus, we
have used the software Dynare to obtain a solution for the equilibrium implied by a given policy by
solving a second-order approximation to the constraints, then evaluating welfare under the policy using
this approximate solution, as in Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004).20 In particular, we evaluate the welfare
of the three types of agents separately. The individual welfare for savers, borrowers, and the nancial
intermediary, respectively, is as follows:
Ws;t  Et
1X
m=0
ms

logCs;t+m + j logHs;t+m   (Ns;t+m)



; (21)
Wb;t  Et
1X
m=0
mb

logCb;t+m + j logHb;t+m   (Nb;t+m)



; (22)
Wf;t  Et
1X
m=0
mf [logCf;t+m] : (23)
Following Mendicino and Pescatori (2007), we dene social welfare as a weighted sum of the individual
welfare for the di¤erent types of households:
20This approach has become popular in the literature. See for instance, Faia and Monacelli (2007), Bergin et al (2007),
Kim and Ruge-Murcia (2009).
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Wt = (1  s)Ws;t + (1  b)Wb;t + (1  f )Wf;t: (24)
Each agent´s welfare is weighted by her discount factor; respectively, so that the all the groups receive
the same level of utility from a constant consumption stream.
4.2 Capital Requirement Ratios
Figure 3 displays the welfare that each group obtains when increasing the capital requirement ratio for
banks. Notice that results are presented in welfare units (utils),21 since the purpose of this gure is
to illustrate the issue from an ordinal point of view.22 On the other hand, Table 3 presents a measure
for nancial stability associated with di¤erent capital requirements. We take the standard deviation of
credit as a proxy for nancial stability, since a stable nancial system is one in which variability of credit
is low.
Remember that there are two distortions in this economy, corresponding to the two collateral con-
straints, the one for the borrowers and the one for the nancial intermediaries, respectively. Capital
requirements a¤ect directly the second distortion. Savers do not su¤er from any of the distortions.23
We see that there is a welfare trade-o¤ between borrowers and savers. While savers are better o¤ when
banks are required to hold more capital, borrowers are initially worse o¤ with this measure. For the
range of values analyzed, savers are always better o¤ than in a situation with no regulation. Borrowers
are worse o¤ for initial increases but their welfare starts to recover for capital requirements greater than
6%. For capital requirements in the range of 6-16%, they are still worse o¤ than initially. Nevertheless,
for capital requirements larger than 16%, they are better o¤ than in a situation with no regulation. The
reason is that, initially, increasing the capital requirement does not allow borrowers borrow as much as
they would like, the interest rate spread increases, and therefore their consumption decreases. This is the
level e¤ect that a¤ects them negatively. However, as we can see in Table 3, a higher nancial stability is
achieved the higher capital requirements are, and this fact has an e¤ect in terms of consumption stability.
For larger values of the capital requirement ratio, even though the level of consumption decreases, the
21"Utils" refer to the units of welfare in a utility scale. Therefore, the change in utils measures, from an ordinal point of
view, whether agents are better o¤.
22 In this section and the next one, we do not consider welfare in consumption equivalent units since it is not clear what
the benchmark situation would be. However, in subsequent sections, when we make the comparison between Basel I, II
with Basel III, we take the rst case as a benchmark and present welfare gains from the new regulation in consumption
equivalents.
23Note that in a model with sticky prices, this distortion would a¤ect savers. Prices are fully exible in this setting.
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volatility e¤ect prevails and this is why borrowers end up being better o¤. Saving is equal to borrowing
in equilibrium. Thus, since the level of borrowing decreases with higher capital requirements, savers can
use part of their saving for their own consumption. Therefore, savers are better o¤.
For banks, the argument is similar to the one of the borrowers. Albeit their welfare decreases for
lower values of the capital requirement ratio, it starts to increase from a certain value of this parameter.
When capital requirements increase, banks cannot lend as much as they would like and their constraint
becomes tighter. This negatively a¤ects their dividend as a level e¤ect. Nevertheless, welfare values
increase after a certain threshold of the capital requirement ratio. Thus, for lower values of the capital
requirement ratio, below the range of the Basel regulation, banks welfare slightly decreases. However,
increasing the capital requirement ratio further helps reducing the distortion implied by the collateral
constraint of bankers. Given that they cannot smooth their consumption by themselves, higher capital
requirements limit the loans they can make, stabilizing the nancial system and, therefore, making their
pattern of consumption also more stable. This is the volatility e¤ect implied by a more stable nancial
system, as shown in Table 3.
The lower left panel represents welfare of the households, disregarding banks. If we look at the
welfare of the households, we see that increasing capital requirements is welfare enhancing,24 that is, the
welfare gain experimented by the savers compensates the initial loss of the borrowers.25
Table 3: Volatility of Borrowing
CRR 1% 5% 10% 15% 20%
STD (B) 5:97 4:98 4:17 3:60 3:17
5 Optimal Implementation of Basel III
Basel III states that there should be an extra countercyclical capital bu¤er in order to avoid excessive
credit growth. The purpose of this bu¤er is the protection of the whole banking system from periods
of excessive credit growth activities. It will work on preventing banks from following more than needed
expansionary credit policies during economic booms that would increase the severity of ination or more
than needed contractionary ones during deation that would deepen the economic downturn.
The size of the bu¤er is set by the regulator and must take into account the macroeconomic en-
vironment in which banks operate. Therefore, it will be applied considering national circumstances of
24Higher capital requirements increase borrower welfare in steady state. The e¤ects in transition may be di¤erent.
25The "Households" panel corresponds to the aggregation between borrowers and savers.
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Figure 3: Welfare derived from increasing the capital requirement ratio (in utils).
countriesbanks and related nancial institutions.
However, the Basel III accord does not fully specify the criteria to change the capital requirement or
under which specic conditions. There are, nevertheless, several things that we can infer from the Basel
III statement:
-The countercyclical bu¤er is a macroprudential policy that uses the capital requirement ratio as an
instrument.
-The main objective of this bu¤er in Basel III is to avoid excessive credit growth.
-The regulator should also use macroeconomic variables as indicators of excessive credit growth as
well as the credit growth itself.
Thus, along these lines, we propose a rule on the capital requirement ratio that includes credit growth,
house prices and output in order to explicitly promote nancial stability. For the choice of the variables
to be considered in the rule, we have followed the guidance stated by the IMF, the Committee on the
Global Financial System, and the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. The IMF (2013) states
that a rise in house price can act as a leading indicator of excessive credit growth since they lead to
wealth e¤ects that permit the increase in borrowing. This wealth e¤ect is present in our model through
the collateral constraint for borrowers. The Committee on the Global Financial System (2012) identies
real estate prices as a potential indicator that could guide the build-up of capital-based instruments.
In the same document, this Committee remarks the importance of variables such as real GDP growth
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and real estate prices in the stress tests that can provide quantitative guidance on how capital levels
should be adjusted.In turn, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, in its Guidance for national
authorities operating the countercyclical capital bu¤er(2010), recommends to consider credit variables
as well as a broad set of information to take bu¤er decisions in both the build-up and release phases.
Some examples of variables that may be useful indicators in both phases include various asset prices and
real GDP growth.
In this way, the countercyclical capital bu¤er would be implemented as a simple rule, in the spirit of
the Taylor rules used for monetary policy.26
CRRt = (CRRSS)

Bt
Bt 1
b Yt
Y
y qt
q
q
(25)
This rule states that whenever regulators observe that credit is growing, or output and house prices
are above their steady-state value, they automatically increase the capital requirement ratio to avoid an
excess in credit. Then, this rule captures the macroprudential approach of Basel III so that it anticipates
credit growth and avoids it before hand, and it uses the capital requirement ratio as an instrument to
achieve this goal. The goal is explicitly embedded in the rule since capital requirements respond directly
to credit growth. This macroprudential rule also includes other macroeconomic variables that can be
seen as indicators of credit growth such as output and house price deviations from their respective steady
states.27
Then, we study what the optimal implementation of the macroprudential countercyclical capital
bu¤er would be, that is, the one that would maximize welfare.
5.1 Optimal Parameters
Table 4 presents the optimal parameters in equation (25) that maximize social welfare and compare
results in terms of welfare gains with respect to the benchmark (no regulation, that is, there is no capital
requirement).
We see that under Basel I and II (rst column), only savers benet from higher capital requirements,
with respect to the no regulation situation. The second column shows the increase in capital requirements
26Note that the Taylor rule for monetary policy uses the interest rate as an instrument and it responds to output an
ination.
27We have also experimented with a symetric countercyclical rule for the LTV to compare the two instruments. In
order to make both rules comparable, we have set all the reaction parameters equal to 0.5. We nd that a comparable
countercyclical rule for the LTV is more e¤ective than the CRR rule in terms of increasing nancial stability. In terms of
welfare trade-o¤s, both rules deliver similar qualitative results.
20
stated in Basel III without taking into account the countercyclical capital bu¤er. We nd that increasing
the capital requirements as in Basel III makes everyone better o¤ with respect to Basel I, II. Therefore,
Basel III, with no countercyclical bu¤er, already represents a welfare improvement with respect to Basel
I, II.
Albeit, optimally implementing the countercyclical capital bu¤er, that is the third column named
Basel IIIMP , manages to increase total welfare with respect to a situation of no regulation. Never-
theless, the losers in this case are the savers. Savers are better o¤ with increases in the static capital
requirement ratio but not with the countercyclical bu¤er, since it implies higher spreads. However, the
countercyclical bu¤er provides a more stable nancial scenario, as it can be inferred from the volatility
of borrowing. Both borrowers and banks benet from this measure because it helps them both smooth
their consumption and reduce the collateral distortions that a¤ect them. Savers, who are not collateral
constrained, do not benet from this scenario.
In terms of the optimal implementation of the rule, we observe that the regulator should attach
relatively more weight to the output and the house price parameters in the rule, rather than to the
credit growth parameter. The reason is that these variables serve as an anticipated indicator of credit
growth and, therefore, help the regulator achieve its macroprudential goal; when the regulator observes
credit growth itself, it may be too late to avoid it.
Table 4: Optimal Implementation of Basel III
Basel I, II Basel III Basel IIIMP
CRRSS 8% 8%+ 2:5% 8% + 2:5%
b - - 0:1
y - - 1:9
q - - 1:6
Welfare gain
Savers 2:97 3:29  0:88
Borrowers  0:58  0:49 2:61
Banks  0:99  0:98 1:58
Total  0:99  0:96 4:61
Volatility of Borrowing
STD (B) 4:46 4:11 2:18
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Figure 4: Impulse responses to a technology shock. Basel III versus Basel IIIMP .
5.2 Simulations
Here, we simulate the model for the Basel III requirements compared with Basel IIIMP to study the
procyclicality of regulations, a much discussed topic in the literature. Basel III require a total capital of
10.5%. In order to simulate Basel IIIMP , we also consider a capital requirement of 10.5% in the steady
state, together with the optimal macroprudential rule found in the previous section for the capital bu¤er.
Notice, that this section is positive, describing the dynamics of the model. The previous section was
normative, studying welfare.
Figure 4 presents the model impulse responses to a technology shock for the two alternative scenarios:
Basel III and Basel IIIMP . Observe that these impulse responses are showing the pattern of the variables
following a shock, that is, their deviations from their steady state. Note that welfare calculations (Table
4) show second order approximations, that is, volatilities which can be used for normative evaluations.
Thus, Figure 4 and Table 4 are not directly comparable.
We see that under Basel IIIMP , following the technology shock, the capital requirement increases
about 2% with respect to its steady state, while it remains at the steady state under Basel III. This
higher capital requirement under Basel IIIMP makes borrowing not to increase as much with the shock.
Then, borrowers and banks can consume less under Basel IIIMP but this is compensated by an increase
in consumption by savers, which o¤sets aggregate di¤erences. In terms of procyclicality of the regulation,
we add to the discussion by disaggregating the e¤ects among di¤erent agents. Our results show that
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the impact of this measure are countercyclical for the agents directly a¤ected by the capital requirement
ratio, i.e. borrowers and banks, while procyclical for savers.
6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we take as a baseline a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model, which
features a housing market and a nancial intermediary, in order to evaluate the welfare achieved by Basel
I, II, and III regulations. Therefore, in the model, there are three types of agents: savers, borrowers and
banks. Borrowers are constrained in the amount they can borrow. Banks are constrained in the amount
they can lend, that is, there is a capital requirement ratio for banks.
First, we evaluate how the model responds to changes in the capital requirement ratio from a positive
point of view. We observe that higher capital requirements decrease the quantity of borrowing in the
economy and, as a consequence, both borrowers and banks can consume less. This is o¤set by higher
consumption by savers.
Then, we calculate the welfare e¤ects of increasing the capital requirement ratio on the di¤erent
agents of the model. Our results show that there is a welfare trade-o¤ between borrowers and savers.
While savers are better o¤ when banks are required to hold more capital, borrowers and banks are
initially worse o¤ with this measure. On the one hand, increasing the capital requirement does not
allow them borrow and lend as much as they would like, respectively, and, therefore, their consumption
decreases. This is the level e¤ect that a¤ects them negatively. However, given binding constraints,
the nancial system is more stable with higher capital requirements. For larger values of the capital
requirement ratio, this volatility e¤ect coming from a second-order approximation, which makes their
consumption more stable, prevails and both borrowers and banks end up being better o¤. For savers,
this implies a higher pattern of consumption because in equilibrium, when borrowing decreases, they do
not need to save as much.
After that, we propose a macroprudential rule for the capital bu¤er of Basel III (Basel IIIMP ). With
this rule, capital requirements would respond to credit growth, output and house prices. We nd the
optimal parameters of the rule that maximize welfare. The regulator should attach relatively more weight
to the output and the house price parameters in the rule, rather than to the credit growth parameter,
given that they serve as an anticipated indicator of credit growth. In terms of welfare, we see that the
macroprudential component of Basel IIIMP delivers higher welfare for the society than a situation with
23
no regulation.
Finally, using the optimized parameters, we simulate the model to study the procyclicality of Basel
IIIMP , a much discussed topic in the literature. We observe that, after a technology shock, capital
requirements increase under Basel IIIMP . This macroprudential rule cuts borrowing, achieving the goal
of the regulation, which is to avoid excessive credit growth. We add to the discussion nding that Basel
IIIMP is countercyclical for borrowers and banks, the agents directly a¤ected by capital requirements,
while procyclical for savers.
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Appendix
Steady-State of the main model
Cs +D = RsD +WsNs; (26)
Rs =
1
s
(27)
qHs
Cs
=
j
(1  s) (28)
Ws = (Ns)
 1Cs (29)
Cb =
s   1
s
B +WbNb; (30)
B = skqHb; (31)
b = (s   b) ; (32)
1
Cb
(q   (s   b)skq   bq) = j
Hb
; (33)
Wb = (Nb)
 1Cb; (34)
Cf +Bt =
s   1
s
D +RbB; (35)
D
B
= ; (36)
f = (s   f ) ; (37)
1   (s   f )
f
= Rb;
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Y = ANs N
1 
b ; (38)
Ws = A

Ns
Nb
 1
; (39)
Wb = A (1  )

Ns
Nb

: (40)
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